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CAN NEUROSCIENCE HELP PREDICT 
FUTURE ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR? 
Lyn M. Gaudet,* Jason P. Kerkmans,** Nathaniel E. Anderson*** 
& Kent A. Kiehl**** 
INTRODUCTION 
Our society is founded on a collection of rules regarding acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior.  These rules are shaped by beliefs and values and 
are subject to revision through the democratic legislative process.  For the 
most part, the rules are well known and widely followed.  Society functions 
on the premise that its members are aware of and will follow the rules.  Our 
criminal justice system, in turn, is designed to determine if a violation of 
society’s rules occurred and whether that violation warrants a sanction.  If 
so, the justice system assesses the level of responsibility, culpability, and 
punishment appropriate for individual offenders.  Given these 
responsibilities, the criminal justice system has to make decisions regarding 
individuals.  These decisions often involve prediction.  Indeed, most 
decisions in the criminal justice system involve some form of prediction.  
Consider, for example, the following decisions:  choosing whether or not to 
grant bail, probation, or parole to an individual; establishing whether an 
individual is eligible for treatment; and determining his or her appropriate 
sentence.  Each of these processes involves some type of evaluation of an 
individual in order to make a decision—ideally an informed, objective, and 
reliable decision—about what he or she is likely to do or to not do in the 
future. 
A key concern for the criminal justice system is an individual’s 
likelihood of displaying future antisocial behavior, or behavior that involves 
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a disregard for the rules and the well-being of others.  The traditional 
assessments used to evaluate offenders for future risk of antisocial or 
violent behavior include self-reporting measures, various types of 
interviews, and expert-administered test batteries.  These tools seek to 
assess possible intellectual and cognitive impairment and to measure 
psychological and neuropsychological constructs, including personality 
states and traits.  But, given that the brain has the most proximal influence 
on behavior, direct measures of brain structure and function may be better 
than proxy measures in predicting future antisocial behavior.  The question 
then becomes:  If we can get information from neuroscience techniques, 
does that information add predictive utility to understanding and assessing 
antisocial behavior?  To date, studies suggest that it does. 
Part I of this Article reviews the tools currently available to predict 
antisocial behavior.  Part II discusses legal precedent regarding the use of, 
and challenges to, various prediction methods.  Part III introduces recent 
neuroscience work in this area and reviews two studies that have 
successfully used neuroimaging techniques to predict recidivism.  Part IV 
discusses some criticisms that are commonly levied against the various 
prediction methods and highlights the disparity between the attitudes of the 
scientific and legal communities toward risk assessment generally and 
neuroscience specifically.  Lastly, Part V explains why neuroscience 
methods will likely continue to help inform and, ideally, improve the tools 
we use to help assess, understand, and predict human behavior. 
I.  PREDICTION TOOLS FOR FUTURE ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 
The goal of any type of forensic assessment is to help legal decision 
makers make more informed predictions about individuals within the 
criminal justice system.  There are many different methods and techniques 
used to predict future antisocial behavior.  Many of these methods are 
aimed at predicting future violent behavior specifically, which may also be 
described as future dangerousness.  Specific approaches are reviewed later 
in this Article, but regardless of the approach, there are certain factors, or 
variables, that have been associated with violence.  These factors can be 
organized into four categories:  dispositional, historical, clinical, and 
contextual.1  Dispositional, or demographic, factors include age, gender, 
race, socioeconomic status, cognitive functioning, and neurological status.2  
Historical variables include all significant events from an individual’s past, 
such as criminal history, substance abuse history, and employment.3  
Clinical factors include psychiatric and personality disorders and 
symptoms.4  Lastly, contextual factors refer to the environment and to 
 
 1. See generally Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, Predicting Violence in 
Mentally and Personality Disordered Individuals, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW:  THE STATE OF 
THE DISCIPLINE 175 (Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999). 
 2. See D.A. Louw et al., Prediction of Violent Behaviour:  Professionals’ Appraisal, 5 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 379, 380 (2005). 
 3. See id. at 382. 
 4. See id. at 384. 
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aspects of the person-environment interaction, including access to drugs, 
weapons, or victims, the level of supervision and support, and stress 
factors.5  The weight or importance attached to the various factors depends 
on the model and technique being used and the specific outcome being 
predicted. 
One important caveat relating to the factors that are helpful in predicting 
future violence is that the relationship between the risk factor and violence 
may be nuanced and not a direct causal relationship.  In addition, there may 
be disparate findings in the literature, making it difficult to discern whether 
a construct or condition is truly predictive.  For example, research published 
in the 1990s found a positive association between violence and some types 
of mental illness, particularly psychosis and schizophrenia.6  Subsequent 
studies found psychotic disorders to be negatively related to violence risk.7  
The mixed findings were largely due to differences in methodology and 
study quality.8  Recent data suggest that individuals with schizophrenia who 
display specific psychotic symptoms are, in fact, at an increased risk for 
committing violence, and “this risk is increased by brain abnormalities, 
psychiatric comorbidities, and demographic factors.”9  Another critical 
caveat in the relationship between psychosis and violence is how it can be 
mediated by effective treatment.10  The risk that an individual in the general 
population will commit a homicide is approximately 1 in 25,000.11  
Worldwide risk for homicide in first-episode patients with psychosis is one 
in 629 presentations, whereas the risk drops to one in 9,090 presentations if 
the patient receives treatment.12  Thus, the relationship between psychosis 
and risk for violence is mediated by a number of factors.  The statistics, 
however, do support the argument that early identification and treatment is 
the best way to reduce the risk for homicide and violence in patients with 
mental illness.  This example highlights the complexity of developing 
prediction models for future violence and how the models must be flexible 
as science progresses. 
 
 5. See Douglas & Webster, supra note 1, at 216–19. 
 6. See, e.g., John Junginger, Psychosis and Violence:  The Case for a Content Analysis 
of Psychotic Experience, 22 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 91, 91 (1996) (stating that the evidence 
suggests “a moderate but reliable association between mental illness and violence” and “that 
much of the violent behavior observed in the mentally ill is not random but is motivated and 
directed by psychotic symptoms”). 
 7. See generally PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT:  THE 
MACARTHUR STUDY OF MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE (2001); Marnie Rice et al., The 
Appraisal of Violence Risk, 15 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHIATRY 589 (2002). 
 8. See Steven Silverstein et al., Schizophrenia and Violence:  Realities and 
Recommendations, 1 CRIME PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 21 (2015).  
 9. Id. 
 10. See Lyn M. Gaudet et al., Neuroscience of Antisocial Behavior, in THE COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCES 1043 (Michael S. Gazzaniga et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014). 
 11. KENT A. KIEHL, THE PSYCHOPATH WHISPERER:  THE SCIENCE OF THOSE WITHOUT 
CONSCIENCE 202 (2014). 
 12. Olav Nielssen & Matthew Large, Rates of Homicide During the First Episode of 
Psychosis and After Treatment:  A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 36 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 702, 702 (2010). 
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A.  Clinical Predictions 
Arguably, the oldest type of assessment and prediction in forensic 
settings was performed by mental health professionals—usually 
psychiatrists or psychologists—who would evaluate an individual to 
determine if he or she was suffering from any mental health or other 
medical conditions and whether he or she was likely to be dangerous in the 
future. 
These clinical evaluations can either be structured or unstructured.  
Clinical predictions using unstructured clinical interviews involve open 
questions where the individual being interviewed arguably will have more 
freedom to bring up topics and influence the course of the interview.  With 
the unstructured format, clinicians use their professional judgment and 
experience to come to their conclusions regarding the individual’s current 
and future functioning and whether they meet the criteria for any 
diagnoses.13  The reliability and validity of unstructured interviews is 
highly variable because the content and scope of the interview is always 
unique and because different clinicians may place varying amounts of 
weight on different factors.14  Additionally, clinicians might allow their 
emotions, prejudices, or allegiance to one side or the other to influence their 
judgments, whereas the goal is to avoid any biases of the evaluator being 
able to have an effect on the results.15  Because of the inherent unreliability 
that accompanies predictions based on unstructured clinical interviews, they 
should not serve as the basis for a formal risk assessment in forensic 
settings. 
B.  Actuarial Predictions 
Unlike prediction based on subjective clinical judgment, actuarial 
prediction is based on statistical analysis of a subject’s objective 
information.16  Multiple actuarial prediction tools have been developed, and 
appropriate use of these tools requires selecting the correct tool for the 
behavior being predicted and knowing the limitations of the predictive 
utility of each tool. 
1.  Overview 
In the past forty years, there has been great progress in the development 
of objective tools to assess risk in forensic settings.  These tools are referred 
to as actuarial methods of risk prediction.17  These methods rely on specific 
variables that are weighted in predetermined ways, and the person making 
the determination cannot modify those variables or their weighting.18  The 
 
 13. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCIENCE 
1668, 1668 (1989). 
 14. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 590. 
 15. See, e.g., id. 
 16. See Dawes et al., supra note 13. 
 17. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 589. 
 18. See Dawes et al., supra note 13. 
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factors used in actuarial models are determined from longitudinal studies of 
offenders who are scored on a series of variables prior to release.  Over 
time, the person conducting the study follows up with the subject to see 
which variables predicted future risk.19  Decisions reached by actuarial 
methods include positive and negative predictive values, which are 
analogous to true positives and negatives.  Both positive and negative 
predictive values provide the likelihood that an individual indeed belongs to 
the projected group.  There is now a great deal of literature on the ability of 
actuarial tools to reliably predict a variety of outcomes.  In the scientific 
community, the superiority of actuarial methods to clinical predictions has 
been firmly established.20  Examples of commonly used actuarial tools that 
have been found to prospectively predict future antisocial behavior include 
the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), which predicts violent 
behavior, and the Static-99 and Static-2002, which predict recidivism for 
sexual offenders.21 
Some assessment tools, known as structured clinical judgment tools, 
combine clinical and actuarial approaches.22  These tools combine factors 
that are known to predict risk with an opportunity for a clinician to exercise 
judgment.23  The factors being used may not necessarily be based on 
longitudinal data but rather are known to have clinical significance based on 
published research.  An example is the HCR-20 (historical, clinical, and 
risk management scales), which is designed to predict both inpatient 
violence and postrelease violence in forensic psychiatric patients.24  It has 
been found to have predictive validity in large samples.25  The predictive 
utility of the test has been demonstrated in North America, where the tool 
was developed, as well as in the United Kingdom.26 
2.  Static and Dynamic Factors 
To understand current approaches to actuarial risk assessment, it is 
important to understand the difference between static and dynamic factors.  
 
 19. Rice et al., supra note 7, at 590. 
 20. See, e.g., id. (stating that “[t]he latest work coming from the multi-million-dollar 
study of violence risk assessment funded by the MacArthur Foundation stated that actuarial 
methods have been sufficiently shown to be superior to clinical methods of prediction 
‘[m]ore research demonstrating that the outcome of unstructured clinical assessments left a 
great deal to be desired seemed to be overkill:  That horse was already dead’” (quoting 
APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 7, at 7)). 
 21. Grant T. Harris et al., Prospective Replication of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide 
in Predicting Violent Recidivism Among Forensic Patients, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 377 
(2002); Leslie M.D. Helmus & R. Karl Hanson, Predictive Validity of the Static-99 and 
Static-2002 for Sex Offenders on Community Supervision, SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 
(2007), http://www.sexual-offender-treatment.org/index.php?id=60&type=123 [https:// 
perma.cc/4D3D-ET2U]. 
 22. See, e.g., Dawes et al., supra note 13, at 1668. 
 23. See id. 
 24. Nicola S. Gray et al., Predicting Violent Reconvictions Using the HCR-20, 192 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 386 (2008). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 384. 
508 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Static factors, such as age at first arrest, are considered stable and do not 
change over time.  Dynamic factors, such as ongoing alcohol and drug 
abuse, living situation, and employment, can change over time and, 
consequently, can be targeted by treatment interventions.  The most 
effective actuarial assessments rely on static factors, whereas dynamic 
factors need to be targeted by treatment interventions.27  Consequently, the 
most effective tools to predict risk are not the most effective tools to predict 
treatment amenability or response to treatment over time.  For example, the 
VRAG is the preferred assessment tool for predicting violent behavior over 
a relatively long period of time.28  The VRAG places an individual into one 
of nine overall risk levels, but it is insensitive to identifying intervention 
areas or change in risk status since the risk level is determined by the 
individual’s largely unchangeable historic and clinical factors.29 
C.  Psychological and Personality Measures 
Psychological and personality assessment instruments were not designed 
specifically for the purpose of predicting future antisocial behavior.  Yet 
some instruments in these categories have demonstrated utility in predicting 
different types of outcomes. 
1.  Neuropsychological Testing 
Neuropsychological tests are specifically designed to measure a wide 
range of psychological functions that can be linked to structural or 
functional compromise of the brain.30  Individual tests generally provide a 
broad overview of cognition or focus on task-specific cognitive domains, 
such as short-term memory versus long-term memory versus working 
memory; visual and auditory attention; expressive and receptive language; 
executive function; and processing speed.31  Many of these tests were 
developed within the context of evaluating cognition in severe clinical 
conditions (e.g., stroke, epilepsy, and dementia), with a goal of establishing 
structural-functional relationships between specific brain areas and specific 
cognitive skills.32  For example, dysfunction on neuropsychological tests of 
verbal short-term memory is linked to structural or functional compromise 
of the left hippocampal formation.33 
 
 27. See, e.g., Michael S. Caudy et al., How Well Do Dynamix Needs Predict 
Recidivism?:  Implications for Risk Assessment and Risk Reduction, 41 J. CRIM. JUST. 458, 
458 (2013). 
 28. See Harris et al., supra note 21, at 391. 
 29. See id. at 379, 385. 
 30. See John Stratton et al., Murder and Psychosis:  Neuropsychological Profiles of 
Homicide Offenders with Schizophrenia, CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 2 (2016), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cbm.1990/epdf [https://perma.cc/BZ6E-ABUB]. 
 31. See id. at 3–5. 
 32. MURIEL D. LEZAK ET AL., NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 3 (4th ed. 2004). 
 33. See e.g., Endel Tulving and Hans J. Markowitsch, Episodic and Declarative 
Memory: Role of the Hippocampus, 8 HIPPOCAMPUS 198 (1998). 
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In general, neuropsychological dysfunction is established by comparing 
an individual client’s data with information in a normative database derived 
from several hundred neurotypical control subjects without any evidence of 
neurological or psychiatric dysfunction.  In making these comparisons, a 
degree of age matching is almost always required, as normal levels of 
function vary between children, young adults, and seniors.  In some cases, 
sex matching is also required, and it may be important to consider 
additional factors, such as education level, reading skills, and ethnicity. 
A 2015 study demonstrates how neuropsychological data and mental 
health issues are relevant to the risk of violence.34  The study involved 
twenty-five men and women, all of whom were diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and had killed another person.35  All twenty-five participants 
underwent a neuropsychological evaluation.36  The results were consistent 
with prior research indicating “widespread neurocognitive dysfunction 
among homicide offenders with schizophrenia.”37  The researchers 
concluded that “[c]linicians who treat patients with schizophrenia in 
forensic settings should be aware that a combination of low IQ, attentional-
executive dysfunction, auditory hallucinations, paranoid delusions and prior 
criminal history might be a potentially lethal combination.”38  
Consequently, an assessment of the neurocognitive status of an individual 
through neuropsychological testing is one of the pieces of information that 
can offer insight as to the risk that an individual may commit a violent 
crime in the future. 
There have also been a number of studies that have sought to better 
understand the relationship between impulsivity and violence by collecting 
neuropsychological and other data from inmates and control subjects, as 
well as individuals in the community who have committed acts of violence 
but not been referred to the criminal justice or mental health systems.39  
Previous neuropsychological research had identified frontal and executive 
dysfunction in individuals who had committed violent acts.40  Those 
studies, however, did not distinguish between the different types of violence 
that was committed, a factor that may have unique neuropsychological 
correlates.41  A consistent finding from the neuropsychology literature, in 
both criminals and noncriminals, is the inverse relationship between verbal 
abilities and impulsive aggression.42  Impairments in executive control 
 
 34. See generally Stratton et al., supra note 30. 
 35. Id. at 1. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 11. 
 38. Id.  
 39. See, e.g., Ernest S. Barratt et al., Neuropsychological and Cognitive 
Psychophysiological Substrates of Impulsive Aggression, 41 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 1045 
(1997); Matthew S. Stanford et al., Neuropsychological Correlates of Self-Reported 
Impulsive Aggression in a College Sample, 23 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 961 
(1997). 
 40. See, e.g., Benedetto Vitiello et al., Subtyping Aggression in Children and 
Adolescents, 2 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 189 (1990). 
 41. Stanford et al., supra note 39, at 961. 
 42. Barratt et al., supra note 39, at 1047. 
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processes were also found in community members who had committed acts 
of impulsive aggression, specifically impairments in impulse control and as 
verbal strategic processing.43 
2.  Psychopathic Personality Disorder 
Arguably, the single best predictor of criminal behavior and recidivism is 
psychopathy.44  Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterized by a 
collection of affective and behavioral traits that include a lack of empathy, 
guilt, and remorse; shallow affect; early behavioral problems; persistent 
irresponsibility; impulsivity; and poor behavioral controls in adulthood.45 
Psychopathy is most reliably assessed using the Hare Psychopathy 
Checklist (PCL), originally published in 198046 and revised in 1991 
(PCL-R), and it is the standard measurement tool for psychopathy in 
institutional settings.47  Administration of the PCL-R includes a 
semistructured interview and collateral file review.48  The PCL-R includes 
twenty items that are scored either as a zero, one, or two.49  A score of zero 
is appropriate if the item does not apply to the individual in any aspect of 
his or her life.50  A score of one is appropriate if the item applies to some 
aspects of the individual’s life.51  And a score of two is appropriate if the 
item applies to most aspects of an individual’s life.52  The test is designed to 
identify traits.  Traits are stable over time and are going to be present in all 
of an individual’s interactions with the world in all domains of his or her 
life.53 
Within one year of release from prison, high-PCL-R scorers are three 
times more likely to commit a violent crime than are low scorers.54  Within 
ten years of release, over 70 percent of high-PCL-R scorers who have a 
history of violence will commit another violent offense.  Within twenty 
years of release, longitudinal studies suggest that as many as 90 percent of 
high-PCL-R scorers who have a history of violence will be rearrested for a 
 
 43. Stanford et al., supra note 39, at 964. 
 44. See, e.g., James F. Hemphill et al., Psychopathy and Recidivism:  A Review, 3 LEGAL 
& CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 139 (1998). 
 45. Id. at 139–40. 
 46. Robert D. Hare, A Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy in Criminal 
Populations, 1 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 111 (1980). 
 47. ROBERT D. HARE, THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST—REVISED (PCL-R) (1991) 
[hereinafter HARE, PCL-R].  For the 2003 update of the manual, see ROBERT D. HARE, 
MANUAL FOR THE REVISED PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST (2d ed. 2003). 
 48. See HARE, PCL-R, supra note 47. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. For examples and a review of scoring PCL-R items, see generally KIEHL, supra 
note 11. 
 54. Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 160; see also Gaudet et al., supra note 10 
(discussing psychopathy and recidivism). 
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violent crime.  The recidivism rate for low-PCL-R violent offenders is 
approximately 40 percent.55 
The research demonstrates that an assessment of psychopathic 
personality traits, when present in high levels (i.e., a score greater than or 
equal to thirty out of forty), are at least as predictive as combinations of 
traditional risk variables and can add predictive utility beyond criminal 
history variables alone.56  Psychopathy also is predictive of the offenders 
who are likely to continue to engage in antisocial behavior past the age of 
forty, when recidivism rates usually drop off in nonpsychopathic 
offenders.57  Because the PCL-R is a reliable and valid measure for 
assessing stable personality traits that are associated with violation of norms 
and poor behavioral controls, it is not surprising that it is able to predict 
both violent and nonviolent criminal recidivism.58 
II.  APPLICATION OF PREDICTION METHODS 
IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior.  The fact that such a 
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made.  
Indeed, prediction of future criminal conduct is an essential element in 
many of the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.59 
Today, just as Justice John Paul Stevens wrote above in 1976, the U.S. 
criminal justice system demands predictions of future behavior.  And as 
Justice Stevens knew then, prediction is used at every level of the system, 
from setting bail through sentencing and at parole hearings.  In addition, 
behavior predictions can impact the general tenets underlying our 
punishment structure at the legislative level. 
A.  Recidivism Rates 
One of the ways in which the effectiveness of a criminal justice system is 
measured is through recidivism rates.  The construct of recidivism, 
however, is an extremely broad outcome variable.  Recidivism encompasses 
all behavior that could result in rearrest.  Recidivism can be broken down 
into different types, or categories:  general/nonviolent recidivism, violent 
 
 55. Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 148; see also Robert D. Hare et al., Psychopathy 
and the Predictive Validity of the PCL‐R:  An International Perspective, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 
623, 638–39 (2000); Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 625, 630 (1991); Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-Validation and 
Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 231, 236–37 (1997). 
 56. See Hemphill et al., supra note 44, at 139. 
 57. Harris, supra note 55, at 633. 
 58. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas, Gina M. Vincent & John F. Edens, Risk for Criminal 
Recidivism:  The Role of Psychopathy, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOPATHY 533 (Christopher J. 
Patrick ed., 2006); see also Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy as a Clinical 
and Empirical Construct, 4 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 217, 218–21 (2008); Randall T. 
Salekin et al., A Review and Meta‐Analysis of the Psychopathy Checklist and Psychopathy 
Checklist‐Revised:  Predictive Validity of Dangerousness, 3 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 203 (1996). 
 59. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274–75 (1976). 
512 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
recidivism, sexual recidivism, and sexually violent recidivism.  Those 
categories can be broken down further until there is a specific behavior that 
can be operationalized so that it can be assessed, quantified, and studied in a 
meaningful way. 
General-level data does serve a purpose nonetheless.  Returning to the 
overall construct of recidivism, the Bureau of Justice Statistics within the 
U.S. Department of Justice compiles reports regarding the number of 
released individuals who return to prison, providing a rough measure of the 
effectiveness of the criminal justice system in deterring those incarcerated 
from returning to criminal behavior.60  In 2005, 67 percent of the 404,638 
state prisoners released in thirty states were arrested within three years of 
release, and 76 percent were arrested within five years.61  Approximately 50 
percent of inmates released in twenty-three states had a parole or probation 
violation or an arrest that led to subsequent imprisonment within three 
years.62 
These general recidivism rates are examples of the macrolevel analysis 
that makes its way into the criminal justice system.  More select and 
specific examples of predictive tools, including both clinical and actuarial 
tools, commonly make their way into the justice system at both the case 
level and parole-hearing level as well. 
B.  Legal Decisions Involving 
Predictions of Future Dangerousness 
Civil commitment determinations are one example of legal proceedings 
that rely heavily on predictions of future behavior.  Civil commitment is the 
confinement of an ill, incompetent, drug-addicted, or similar person outside 
of the criminal justice system.63  As early as 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that “the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to 
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from 
restraint.”64  The security and prosperity of the state allowed for this 
“reasonable” restriction of liberty.65  More recently, the Court has reiterated 
that the citizens’ right to liberty is not absolute, but has long been subject to 
restraint in “certain narrow circumstances.”66  As long as procedural and 
evidentiary conditions are met, the involuntary civil commitment of 
dangerous persons “is [not] contrary to our understanding of ordered 
 
 60. See Recidivism, BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/YA4C-KQ5Z]. 
 61. MATTHEW DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS 
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005:  PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, at 28 (2014), http:// 
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UUA-XGQX]. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Civil Commitment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 64. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
 65. Id. (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 628–29 (1898); R.R. v. 
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1877); Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140, 148 
(1855)). 
 66. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997). 
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liberty.”67  In rejecting challenges to the civil commitment of sexual 
offenders under substantive due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto 
theories, the Court has explained that civil commitment of sexually violent 
predators is allowable when future dangerousness is linked to a “‘mental 
abnormality’ or ‘personality disorder’ that makes it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.”68 
Clinical assessments have long been used in civil commitment 
proceedings.  In fact, since civil commitment hearings first began, 
psychiatrists have been allowed to offer their opinions on the ultimate 
issues before the judge—whether a potential patient is mentally ill, 
dangerous, or in need of treatment.69  This same latitude has been afforded 
to psychiatrists in criminal proceedings as well, where they have been 
allowed to not only make diagnoses, but to predict whether or not a 
defendant was likely to commit acts of violence in the future.70 
Psychiatric prediction of future behavior has been called into question 
and challenged strongly in court.71  In a series of three cases, the Supreme 
Court has, however, upheld the use of psychiatrists to assess and testify to 
their opinions on a defendant’s future dangerousness.72  Despite the Court’s 
acknowledgement that such psychiatric predictions “may be countered not 
only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so unreliable that 
[they] should be ignored,” the Court has continued to allow for their 
admission in sentencing decisions.73 
In Jurek v. Texas,74 the defendant argued that the Texas statute 
permitting the jury to impose the death penalty violated the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it required the jury to predict the 
defendant’s future behavior.75  Under Texas law, the jury was statutorily 
required to find “a probability that the defendant would commit criminal 
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society” in 
order to sentence a defendant to death.76  In Jurek, however, the Court held 
“[t]he task that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory 
question in issue is thus basically no different from the task performed 
countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal 
 
 67. Id. (recognizing the colonial and early American history of civil commitment 
statutes and the Court’s consistent upholding of “such involuntary commitment statutes 
provided the confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary 
standards”). 
 68. Id. at 358.  It is worth noting that this view is not without substantial controversy, 
and civil commitment continues to be heavily litigated. 
 69. See, e.g., Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of 
Expertise:  Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 694 (1974). 
 70. See generally Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
 71. See id. at 899–901. 
 72. See generally Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Barefoot, 463 U.S. 
880; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 73. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 882. 
 74. 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 75. See id. at 268. 
 76. Id. 
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justice.”77  As a result, the Court held that so long as the jury has all 
possible and relevant information in front of it, even lay people are allowed 
to assess and predict future dangerousness.78 
A more direct challenge to the use and effectiveness of clinical future 
prediction came before the Court less than ten years later in Barefoot v. 
Estelle.79  There, the defendant argued that psychiatrists, both at the 
individual level and as a group, did such a poor job at actually predicting 
when a defendant would be a future danger to the community that they 
should be prevented from testifying to such opinions altogether.80  
Surprisingly, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) supported the 
defendant’s argument, and in a brief to the Court explained that such 
psychiatric testimony is so unreliable that the jury and system will not be 
competent to recognize and evaluate its shortcomings.81  The Court again 
disagreed, this time citing Jurek’s allowance of a lay jury’s ability to predict 
future dangerousness as support.82  Given Jurek’s holding, “it makes little 
sense, if any, to submit that psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of 
persons who might have an opinion on the issue, would know so little about 
the subject that they should not be permitted to testify.”83  Additionally, 
Barefoot drew on the fact that there was no suggestion that psychiatrists 
were always wrong in predicting future dangerousness, but rather only that 
they were wrong most of the time, as enough to pass the bar for 
admission.84 
In the third case in this series, Simmons v. South Carolina,85 the Court 
limited Jurek and Barefoot.  The Simmons Court held that in capital cases 
where the prosecution predicts a defendant will be a future danger, the trial 
court must inform the jury that the only possible alternative sentence, other 
than death, is life imprisonment without parole.86  More important for this 
Article’s purpose, however, is what the Court did not hold.  Specifically, 
the jury is still free to predict whether or not the defendant will be a future 
danger to those within a prison or to the greater community outside the 
prison through the use of an outside agent or group.  Specifically in regard 
to the admissibility of future prediction tools, the Court did not limit, in any 
way, the admissibility of the argument that the defendant will be a future 
danger to such groups—i.e., fellow inmates, guards, and administrators in 
the prison or the outside community through an agent—despite the fact that 
such predictions of future dangerousness are even less likely to be reliable 
given the low rate of future violence for capital offenders in custody. 
 
 77. Id. at 275–76. 
 78. See id. at 276. 
 79. 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
 80. Id. at 884–85. 
 81. See id. at 920–22. 
 82. Id. at 897–98. 
 83. Id. at 897. 
 84. Id. at 901. 
 85. 512 U.S. 154 (1994). 
 86. See id. at 161–62. 
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While psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness have clearly been 
allowed in court as expert opinion testimony, their continued use is not 
without question.  As noted above, claims that psychiatric predictions of 
future dangerousness are worse than chance have previously been 
ineffective at excluding such evidence.87  But with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,88 questions over 
whether clinical assessments alone can meet the new threshold reliability 
requirement have gained traction.  Daubert’s requirement that expert 
evidence meet a benchmark level of reliability before the court opens the 
gate to its use in trial89 is in line with the APA’s contention in Barefoot that 
expert opinion evidence needs to have threshold indices of reliability before 
it is eligible to be considered as evidence.90  And yet, courts have not 
widely found that expert opinions based on clinical predictions of future 
dangerousness fail Daubert.  Although some state-level cases have applied 
the Daubert test to clinical predictions, there has been no Supreme Court 
challenge to settle Daubert’s impact on Barefoot. 
In Texas, Coble v. State91 addressed whether a clinical assessment, 
specifically the prosecution’s forensic psychiatrist’s testimony about the 
defendant’s future dangerousness, was done reliably enough to be 
admissible under Daubert.92  The court found it was not.93  The fact that the 
expert failed to cite any journals, articles, or books related to his predictive 
assessment, and that he had never gone back to review any of the prior 
assessments he had done to determine if or what his error rate may be, led 
the court to hold that he failed to meet his burden of proving scientific 
reliability.94 
Coble, however, does not stand for the proposition that all clinical 
predictive assessments of future dangerousness fail Daubert.  In fact, the 
court went to some length to explain that another psychiatrist, who does not 
repeat this expert’s mistakes, could pass the Daubert test for predicting 
future dangerousness.95  However, the opinion’s footnotes laid out a much 
more skeptical reading of whether the necessary support ever could be 
provided.  In one particular footnote, the court outlined how studies on 
predictions of violence from as early as 1974 show that the state of the 
science is unproven and unsatisfactory.96  Other citations pointed to 
research showing that actuarial prediction tools are superior to clinical 
prediction and that psychiatrists are usually no better at assessing future 
violence than the layperson.97 
 
 87. See, e.g., id.; Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880. 
 88. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 89. Id. at 589. 
 90. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920–23. 
 91. 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
 92. See id. at 277–80. 
 93. Id. at 279–80. 
 94. Id. at 277–80. 
 95. See id. 
 96. Id. at 278 n.63. 
 97. Id. at 278 nn.63 & 65. 
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Early in the same year that Coble was decided, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals had evaluated another Daubert challenge to psychiatric 
predictions of future violence in Davis v. State.98  The Daubert challenge in 
Davis had not been properly preserved at the trial level by the defense, and 
the appellant made no affirmative demonstration of why the expert opinions 
failed Daubert other than to say that the prosecution failed to show the 
experts were qualified and their opinions were reliable.99  Noting this flaw, 
the court nonetheless continued to evaluate the experts and their 
methodologies sua sponte. 
The prosecution had proffered evidence from a psychiatrist and a 
psychologist regarding future dangerousness.100  After detailing their 
background, the court explained that the psychiatrist was able to describe 
his method for assessing future dangerousness as a combination of both 
actuarial and anamnestic method101 (a refined version of clinical prediction, 
which “looks at the person in context and over time, examining and 
learning from his or her life story”102).  His assessment involved looking at 
the presence or absence of factors most strongly associated with a risk of 
future violence, looking at the defendant’s background for factors that 
aggravate or mitigate violence, along with demographic information, 
among other factors.103  Additionally, whereas the psychiatrist had 
interviewed the defendant directly, the psychologist, whose assessment was 
based on two actuarial tools, had not.104  The psychologist used the HCR-20 
and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist to determine if the defendant was at a 
low, medium, or high risk to commit future violent acts.105 
With no other direct challenge to these experts brought by the appellant, 
the court held that both passed Daubert.106  But, Davis did so with the 
following caveat: 
In determining whether evidence derived from a “soft science” such as 
psychology is sufficiently reliable, we examine:  (1) whether the field of 
expertise is a legitimate one, (2) whether the subject matter of the expert’s 
testimony is within the scope of that field, and (3) whether the expert’s 
testimony properly relies upon and/or utilizes the principles involved in 
the field.107 
The relaxed Daubert requirements for “soft science” in Texas, thus, may 
have allowed for the admission of evidence in Davis that otherwise may or 
 
 98. 313 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). 
 99. Id. at 352–53. 
 100. Id. at 353. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Joel A. Dvoskin, Psychiatry in Correctional Settings, in THE 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC PUBLISHING TEXTBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 377, 385 (Robert 
I. Simon & Liza H. Gold eds., 2004). 
 103. Davis, 313 S.W.3d. at 353–54. 
 104. Id. at 354. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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may not have passed the full Daubert analysis.108  The addition of actuarial 
tools also could be what distinguishes an assessment of future 
dangerousness as sufficiently reliable to pass Daubert in comparison to a 
pure clinical assessment alone.109 
Actuarial tools are used widely in one particular area of the legal system:  
the evaluation and civil commitment of sex offenders.  The use of these 
actuarial instruments has been challenged widely under the pre-Daubert 
standard, as articulated in Frye v. United States,110 but not nearly as much 
under Daubert itself.111  And interestingly, in some cases, even when a 
Frye challenge has been made, courts have found that actuarial prediction 
assessments do not fall under the realm of “scientific evidence” as defined 
in Frye.112  In the few civil commitment challenges that do invoke Daubert, 
the court has noted that Daubert does not apply in that jurisdiction.113 
Despite the lack of a widespread admissibility standard for this type of 
evidence and the continued criticisms regarding reliability, the U.S. 
criminal justice system has long relied on, and will foreseeably continue to 
rely on, both clinical and actuarial assessments of future violence.  Legal 
challenges to these instruments have had little effect on their systematic 
use, and the need for prediction measures is too great. 
III.  NEUROSCIENCE AND PREDICTION 
With a recognized need and no perfect prediction tool available, it is 
more than reasonable to consider what other tools are available that can add 
to the overall reliability of a final prediction.  The two forensic 
neuroscience studies discussed below are examples of how the inclusion of 
neuroscientific information can add to the overall confidence of an 
antisocial behavior prediction analysis.  The first study used structural 
neuroimaging techniques to assess maturity, whereas the second used 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 111. See Garcetti v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 217 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(reversing the trial court’s finding that the use of Static-99 was not reliable enough). 
 112. Compare People v. Donelson, No. G031920, 2004 WL 1386352 (Cal. Ct. App. June 
22, 2004) (finding that if the defendant had not failed to preserve the challenge, Static-99 
would have been admissible, but it would not have been subject to Frye), and People v. 
Valadao, No. H023662, 2002 WL 31895664 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2002) (rejecting the 
claim that Static-99 violated due process and stating that Frye does not apply to expert 
opinions concerning future dangerousness), with In re Commitment of Lourash, 807 N.E.2d 
1269 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that, because general acceptance in relevant scientific 
community is required, a Frye hearing is necessary for Static-99 opinion testimony), and In 
re Detention of Hargett, 786 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that testimony based 
on actuarial instruments (MNSOST-R and Static-99) constitutes scientific evidence subject 
to Frye). 
 113. See, e.g., In re Johnson, No. 01-1151, 2002 WL 31309172, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 
16, 2002) (finding that Daubert analysis of actuarial instruments (MNSOST, MNSOST-R, 
Static-99, and RRASOR) is not required, but the evidence still must be relevant and assist 
the trier of fact; the witness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education; and any potential for possible exaggeration by the expert still should 
be considered). 
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functional neuroimaging measures to predict recidivism.  Together, they 
provide a glimpse of the potential that advancing neuroscience may be able 
to contribute to improved prediction. 
A.  Chronological Age Versus Brain Age 
One avenue in which neuroscience-based measures aid in prediction is in 
the quantification of variables that have already been identified for their 
importance in understanding human behavior.  Consider this practical 
example:  age is a powerful variable in the prediction of many behavioral 
and health-related outcomes.  It would be difficult to find an auto insurance 
or medical insurance program that does not consider age in its actuarial 
models.  Likewise, one’s age features prominently in most estimates of the 
likelihood for antisocial behavior.114  Indeed, if we consider the release of 
two inmates from prison, a twenty-five-year-old and a thirty-five-year-old, 
all else being equal, the twenty-five-year-old is roughly 25 percent more 
likely to be reincarcerated within five years following his or her release than 
the thirty-five-year-old.115  Age also features prominently in our decisions 
about holding people accountable for their behavior, as our treatment of 
juvenile offenders is categorically different than that of adults.116 
Why does age carry so much weight in our expectation and judgment of 
individual behavior?  For one, age is a very convenient, though imperfect, 
proxy for a trait that is somewhat more difficult to quantify:  maturity.  As 
we age, we gain experience, we are more familiar with and more likely to 
consider a wider range of consequences, and we are less likely to act 
impulsively.117  The disciplines of psychology and neuroscience can help us 
understand some of the developmental and physiological mechanisms 
responsible for these predictable changes in behavior.  Not surprisingly, our 
brains change dramatically as we age.  Physical changes in the brain have a 
strong influence on the cognitive changes in behavior and decision making 
that we associate with maturity.118  These dramatic changes in brain 
structure and function are measurable with modern neuroscience 
techniques. 
Adolescence is a particularly important period of neural development, 
and it provides us with a good model for how physical changes in the brain 
influence behavior.  Adolescence and young adulthood are quite fairly 
characterized by susceptibility to impulsive, emotionally motivated 
behavior, and conspicuous limitations in behavioral inhibition.119  These 
 
 114. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 61; Paul Gendreau et al., A Meta‐Analysis of the 
Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism:  What Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575 (1996). 
 115. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 61. 
 116. See generally Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 117. See Julia Deakin et al., Risk Taking During Decision-Making in Normal Volunteers 
Changes with Age, 10 J. INT’L NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL SOC’Y 590, 597 (2004). 
 118. See B.J. Casey et al., Structural and Functional Brain Development and Its Relation 
to Cognitive Development, 54 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 244–46 (2000); B.J. Casey et al., 
The Adolescent Brain, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111 (2008). 
 119. See generally L.P. Spear, The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral 
Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 417 (2000). 
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changes are more subtle and complex than one might first realize.  For 
instance, research has shown that it is not simply a lack of knowledge or 
experience that leads to different decision making among youth; rather, 
these differences appear to stem from fundamentally different tolerances for 
risk and evaluation of reward.120  These changes are at least partially due to 
normal age-related cellular and neurochemical changes in the brain. 
Of course, there is variability among individuals in this developmental 
course.  Just as we understand that all ten-year-olds do not exhibit the same 
levels of maturity, we should also recognize that there are many 
biologically derived changes that promote the variation that we typically 
attribute to aging and development.  Furthermore, the brain continues to 
change over time with increasing age.  Starting in early adulthood, almost 
all brain regions decrease in volume as gray matter is lost.121  Many internal 
and external factors influence the progression of these biological changes.  
Education, physical exercise, nutrition, stress, genetics, and social 
experiences all change the brain in meaningful ways.  One reason that 
neuroscience holds so much promise for understanding behavior is that all 
of these variables converge by measurably changing the brain’s structure 
and function.  Understanding that these cellular and neurochemical 
processes are at the root of what we might recognize as age-related changes 
in behavior and cognition gets us one step closer to a more precise way to 
quantify development.  Perhaps most importantly for our purposes here, it is 
reasonable to suspect that these neural changes may be more proximately 
related to observable behavior than to chronological age, which ignores any 
individual variability in actual brain maturation. 
B.  Structural Neuroimaging Data Predicts Recidivism 
A recent study examined the relative utility of neuroimaging measures 
compared to chronological age in the prediction of antisocial behavior.122  
Because age is a very strong predictor of recidivism, it was hypothesized 
that neural correlates of age derived from structural magnetic resonance 
imaging (sMRI) data could be used in place of chronological age in a 
prediction model.  Their research question essentially asked:  What is a 
better predictor of recidivism—chronological age, which is more 
traditionally used in prediction models, or brain age, which is theoretically 
more sensitive to the biological differences that actually influence our 
behavior? 
 
 120. See generally Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent 
Decision-Making:  Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
PUB. INT. 1 (2006); Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence:  New Perspectives from 
Brain and Behavioral Science, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 55 (2007). 
 121. See Judith M. Segall et al., Correspondence Between Structure and Function in the 
Human Brain at Rest, FRONTIERS NEUROINFORMATICS (Mar. 27, 2012), http:// 
journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fninf.2012.00010/full [https://perma.cc/W9DM-84 
B5]. See generally Naftali Raz et al., Regional Brain Changes in Aging Healthy Adults:  
General Trends, Individual Differences and Modifiers, 15 CEREBRAL CORTEX 1676 (2005). 
 122. Robert Whelan & Hugh Garavan, When Optimism Hurts:  Inflated Predictions in 
Psychiatric Neuroimaging, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 746, 747 (2014). 
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To test this question, the research team examined MRI data from over 
1,300 incarcerated males across a wide range of ages, from juvenile 
offenders to older adults (i.e., ages twelve to sixty-five).  They employed an 
analytic technique that divides the brain into smaller partitions of gray 
matter that change in step with one another across individuals.  As 
discussed above, the entire brain does not change uniformly with age; 
rather, these changes occur locally, in critical time-windows of 
development.  Out of thirty partitions of gray matter, nineteen were chosen 
for their strong association with age.  The volume and density of these 
nineteen brain circuits changed systematically across individuals in a 
manner consistent with aging processes.  These volume and density 
measures across individuals were combined to express a kind of “brain age” 
measure, in contrast to their chronological age using date of birth. 
After identifying the brain-age-related measures, the analyses were 
replicated on another independent sample.  As in the first sample, the brain-
age components were highly predictive of chronological age in the 
replication sample.  For technical statistical reasons, it is important that 
these individuals were not used in the initial identification of the predictor 
variables.123  Finally, because the research team had already determined 
who among this second group had remained out of prison and who had been 
reincarcerated following release, they could calculate and test prediction 
models.  A series of models were developed to assess which variables 
predicted reoffending in this sample.  These analyses confirmed that the 
brain-age measures outperformed chronological age in calculating how 
likely an individual was to be reincarcerated.  Specifically, reduced gray 
matter in the anterior temporal lobes, amygdala, and orbital frontal cortex 
was more helpful in predicting rearrest than was chronological age.124 
  
 
 123. Id. 
 124. For a full account of this research, see generally Kent A. Kiehl et al., Age of Gray 
Matters:  Neuroprediction of Recidivism (The Mind Research Network, Working Paper, 
2016). 
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Figure 1:  Structural Neuroimaging Prediction 
of Future Antisocial Behavior 
 
The areas in blue (this figure can be found in color at 
http://fordhamlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Gaudet 
KerkmansAndersonKiehl_November.pdf) depict brain gray matter 
measures that were highly predictive of future antisocial behavior.  The 
regions are also part of a “brain age” algorithm, in that these regions 
change over time with age.  The regions include orbital frontal cortex and 
anterior temporal lobe structures. 
 
The brain areas implicated in this study are not only known to change 
with age, but they also are reasonable targets for assessing the relationship 
between antisocial behavior and neural function.  The amygdala, for 
instance, plays an important role in detecting threatening stimuli in our 
environment as well as in reinforcement learning—i.e., learning about 
rewards and punishments.125  Abnormalities in the structure and function of 
the amygdala have been associated with chronic antisocial behavior and 
psychopathic personality traits.126  The frontal cortex is largely responsible 
for complex “executive functions” of the brain, such as decision making, 
planning ahead, and behavioral control.127  The lower (inferior) portions of 
the frontal cortex (e.g., the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the 
orbitofrontal cortex) are especially important for the prediction of 
consequences and incorporating learned reinforcement contingencies into 
 
 125. See generally Michael Davis & Paul J. Whalen, The Amygdala:  Vigilance and 
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Frontal Lobe Recruited by Diverse Cognitive Demands, 23 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 475 
(2000). 
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ongoing decision making.128  Dysfunction and abnormal structural 
properties in these frontal regions likewise have been prominently 
associated with antisocial behavior, psychopathic traits, and disorders of 
behavioral control.129  The anterior temporal cortex has complex functional 
properties that have been associated with social and emotional cognition, 
including theory of mind reasoning—i.e., taking someone else’s perspective 
and moral judgment.130  Dysfunction and abnormal structure here has been 
associated with unstable mood and irritability, psychopathic traits, and 
abnormal moral processing.131 
No brain operates in isolation, and when considering brain-behavior 
relationships, one should be careful to consider the functionally integrated 
roles that are observable when several brain regions cooperate.  The regions 
identified here for their predictive utility in estimating recidivism are 
conspicuously implicated together for their role in a larger network of brain 
regions sometimes referred to as the paralimbic system.132  This system has 
been extensively studied for its prominent role in differentiating individuals 
with psychopathic personality traits and chronic antisocial behavior.133  
Further, understanding these relationships arms us with highly useful 
information for addressing specific pathophysiological etiological 
mechanisms underlying certain instances of deviant behavior and 
addressing these by developing novel treatment and intervention 
strategies.134 
C.  Functional Neuroimaging Data Predicts Recidivism 
Impulsivity, or behavioral disinhibition, is one of the strongest and most 
studied risk factors for recidivism.135  Risk assessments, personality tests, 
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and neuropsychological testing have all found that higher impulsivity is 
associated with increased risk for future antisocial behavior.  All of these 
techniques rely on proxy measures of the brain’s inhibitory and cognitive 
control systems; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a more direct 
measure of these systems through functional neuroimaging could lend 
incremental utility to the prediction of antisocial behavior.136 
In 2013, the first prospective forensic neuroprediction study was 
published.137  The study collected neuroimaging data from approximately 
one hundred offenders prior to their release.138  The experiment studied 
whether brain activity could predict which offenders would be rearrested 
after release.  Brain activity was measured using the functional MRI (fMRI) 
technique as offenders completed a task known to engage inhibitory 
processes.  The task is known as a “Go/No-Go task,” and it requires that the 
participant respond to some stimuli (“Go trials”) and withhold a response to 
other stimuli (“No-Go trials”).139 
The brain regions and circuits involved in impulse control, also referred 
to as response inhibition, are well documented.140  The brain regions 
involved include the basal ganglia, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).141  The ACC is thought to play a central 
role in the error-monitoring circuit, where it receives error-related 
information from the basal ganglia and frontal cortex to motor areas.142  
There is a great deal of animal and human neuroimaging data that provides 
evidence of the importance of the ACC in the ability to learn and regulate 
behavior; that, during error conflicts, ACC activity increases and improves 
cognitive control; and that the ACC is a highly engaged region during the 
specific Go/No Go functional neuroimaging task used in the study.143  With 
that in mind, the specific hypothesis tested by the study was whether ACC 
activity during the Go/No Go task would contribute to the prediction of 
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antisocial behavior in a longitudinal study of criminal offenders scanned 
prior to their release.144 
Supporting the study hypothesis, ACC activity predicted recidivism 
above and beyond traditional risk assessment measures.145  Within the four-
year follow-up period after release, inmates with low ACC activity were 
four times more likely to be rearrested for a nonviolent crime than inmates 
with high ACC activity.146 
 
Figure 2:  Functional Neuroimaging Prediction 
of Future Antisocial Behavior 
 
Activity within the anterior cingulate cortex elicited during an inhibitory 
task predicted recidivism above and beyond other measures of 
impulsivity.  This figure is a survival curve for predicting rearrest for 
nonviolent crimes only.  The probability that offenders with low anterior 
cingulate activity (group 1; dotted line) would be rearrested for a 
nonviolent crime was 31 percent compared to 52 percent for offenders 
with high anterior cingulate activity (group 2; solid line).147 
IV.  COMMON CRITIQUES OF PREDICTION METHODS 
It is a complex and difficult enterprise to predict human behavior, 
particularly abnormal human social behavior.  Consequently there is no 
perfect prediction tool.  However, there are tools that are better suited to 
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different contexts than others, and there are improvements being made in 
our understanding of different types of antisocial behavior.  The sections 
below discuss common criticisms levied at various methods and provides 
responses to those critiques. 
A.  Clinical 
As summarized above, clinical predictions of future behavior vary widely 
based on clinical and subjective criteria that are, unfortunately, more often 
wrong than right.148  One of the consistent findings regarding clinical 
predictions of dangerousness is that psychiatrists overpredict; meaning, for 
a large number of individuals a psychiatrist believes to be dangerous, if 
those individuals were released, they would not in fact harm themselves or 
others.149  It has been estimated that even with “the most careful, 
painstaking, laborious, and lengthy clinical approach to the prediction of 
dangerousness, false positives may be at a minimum of 60 to 70 
[percent].”150 
Since the 1970s, scholars have questioned the wisdom of allowing 
psychiatrists such latitude in predictions of behavior, particularly future 
dangerousness.  A 1974 law review publication coauthored by an attorney 
and a psychologist explained that the legal community simply must be 
unaware of the large and consistent literature that questions both the 
reliability and validity of psychiatric predictions.151  The authors sought to 
persuade courts to seriously limit the scope of psychiatric testimony, 
particularly in civil commitment proceedings.152  As the case law reviewed 
above demonstrates, their belief was misplaced.  Even after courts learned 
about the questions surrounding this type of psychiatric testimony, the 
judiciary has not changed the scope and type of testimony that psychiatrists 
can offer to predict future dangerousness. 
B.  Actuarial 
In response to the poor predictive utility of clinical assessments alone, 
the use of evidence-based actuarial predictions has grown significantly in 
the legal system over the past few decades.  It was the need for more 
reliable and valid measures that drove scientists to create actuarial models.  
While evidence-based actuarial methods are the preferred form of risk 
assessments, it is essential that the appropriate assessment technique be 
used to address the particular individual and issue at hand.  Use of an 
incorrect assessment technique negates the reliability and validity the tool 
may have established in other contexts. 
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There are multiple types of reliability and validity, all of which bear on 
the utility of different risk assessments in different contexts.  For example, 
external validity is the degree to which results of an experiment, or risk 
assessment tool in this case, can be generalized to other contexts.  External 
validity is a construct of considerable importance when using psychological 
and psychiatric tools to inform forensic decision making, yet it is not 
routinely studied in the legal literature.  For example, one of the creators of 
the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) assessment, Dr. John 
Monahan, explains that the COVR is valid only when applied to acute 
psychiatric patients in inpatient facilities.153  He questions the external 
validity of the COVR when applied to normal offender populations and 
other groups until empirical research can determine the validity of such 
application.154  Despite this admonition, the COVR is routinely used to 
assess risk of violence in offenders that are not acute psychiatric patients.155  
Using the assessment tool on a population other than that for which it was 
developed reduces the confidence in the result of the assessment.  External 
validity is not an issue with an instrument itself but with its application.  
And forensic decision makers need to be cognizant of the specific 
application of the instrument being used. 
Another important finding regarding the use of actuarial assessments are 
some of the practical differences between use of these tools in research 
studies versus their use in the real world.  In research studies, a small 
number of individuals score a large number of cases, making them 
experienced with the instrument itself and its application.  In practice, 
however, individuals in the criminal justice system may only use a 
particular tool occasionally, and they may use a wide variety of tools in 
their jobs, so their familiarity with any one instrument may be relatively 
low.  California mandates the use of the Static-99 for offenders on their 
sexual offender registry.156  A 2014 study examined the reliability and 
validity of the Static-99 and Static-99R as implemented in the State of 
California.  While the overall study results found high predictive accuracy 
of the Static-99 and Static-99R, they found meaningful differences in scores 
based on the scoring experience of the probation and parole officers 
completing the assessment and based on how much supervision they had 
while completing the assessment.157  It was discovered that practice scoring 
of twenty to twenty-five cases, prior to administering the assessment on 
actual offenders, provides an appropriate tradeoff between increased costs 
associated with training and supervision and the increased reliability gained 
in the assessment’s administration.158  This study serves as a reminder that 
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there are practical considerations to using an actuarial assessment and that 
sufficient training is required to apply these instruments properly. 
C.  Neuropsychology 
In considering the utility of neuropsychological testing in forensic 
situations, it is important to keep in mind that most neuropsychological tests 
were developed to identify deficits in conditions of gross pathology.  There 
is mounting evidence that a typical neuropsychological test battery has 
limited sensitivity to mild cognitive deficits,159 which can nevertheless 
substantially compromise performance and quality of life. 
Despite some limitations in sensitivity, neuropsychological tests have 
demonstrated utility in predicting important and forensically relevant 
outcomes, an example of which is identifying the patients that will or will 
not successfully complete treatment.  Impaired performance on 
neuropsychological testing has been found to predict treatment dropout in 
patients with cocaine dependence.160  Further work confirmed that patients 
who drop out of treatment have significantly lower cognitive functioning 
scores compared to patients who were able to complete at least twelve 
weeks of treatment.161  These findings were not affected by demographics 
of the patients, duration or amount of drug use, or presence of 
depression.162  This suggests that individuals with impaired cognitive 
performance may need modified treatment interventions that will improve 
the chance of treatment compliance and completion.163  Studies such as 
these demonstrate the utility that neuropsychological testing may play in 
improving decisions, such as who is eligible for certain treatment programs.  
This use of neuropsychological assessments could help maximize the 
chances that individuals provided with the opportunity will possess the 
capacity to successfully complete treatment.  Such informed decision 
making is especially important when there are limited resources that need to 
be allocated responsibly. 
D.  Neuroprediction 
Neuroprediction is not without its limits.  Yet, similar to actuarial 
models, the criticisms of the potential utility of neuroprediction in forensic 
settings do not seriously seem to take into account the standards that will 
govern its use in a legal setting.  Supreme Court precedent has repeatedly 
confirmed that it does not treat predictions of human behavior the same way 
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as other types of evaluations or expert testimony.164  Any issues with 
limitations of a technique most likely will go to the weight of the evidence, 
not to whether such evidence should be admitted.165 
1.  Overall Accuracy 
One criticism levied against neuroimaging data as a prediction tool is that 
it is not 100 percent accurate.  The same criticism can be said of any other 
risk assessment instrument or predictive tool.  Neuroimaging data should 
not be held to a different standard than any other type of evidence.  The 
legal system must make decisions, and the goal of any type of predictive 
tool is to help make better decisions than would or could be made without 
such tools.  Consequently, failure to deliver perfect accuracy is not a 
persuasive criticism against the use of neuroscience data in risk equations, 
especially if it adds value to the overall collection of predictive instruments. 
2.  Group to Individual 
Another common critique of neuroimaging-based predictions, similar to 
actuarial predictions, is that they are designed to predict membership in a 
group rather than predict the outcome associated with a single individual.  
Again, this is true of any type of prediction instrument that is based on 
group statistics.  And the non-group-level research has established that even 
though clinical predictions are based only on individual data, they are 
inferior in their ability to accurately and reliably predict future behavior.166  
Furthermore, the ability to compare individual neuroimaging datasets to 
large normative databases (of healthy control subjects) allow for 
statistically based statements about one individual’s data being within or 
outside of normal limits.  This type of comparison is akin to the normative 
data comparison that underlies neuropsychological testing and rebuts the 
argument that statements cannot be made about any one individual using 
neuroimaging data. 
A follow-up to the study discussed in Part III.C evaluated its predictive 
accuracy by testing discrimination and calibration (a version of out-of-
sample testing).167  Overall, the ACC activity was modest to strong in terms 
of its ability to discriminate between outcomes and had good calibration 
accuracy.168  This means that future studies should be able to replicate the 
effects.  In addition, the authors wanted to determine the unique 
contribution of the ACC region of interest to the model’s predictive 
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accuracy.169  They did this by removing the ACC parameter from the two 
models, refitting those two new models, and comparing them to the original 
full models.170  In both models, the full model performs far better with the 
ACC predictor included than when excluded.171 
Critics of neuroscience data, similar to critics of actuarial prediction, also 
rarely describe an alternative method to make better risk-related 
decisions.172 
3.  Unique Legal and Ethical Issues for Neuroprediction 
A valid concern raised during discussions of neuroprediction is whether 
there are any unique legal and ethical issues relating to the use of biological 
variables to predict risk. 
One potential example is whether neuroscience data may have equal 
protection implications.  Will neuroscience-based risk profiles indicating a 
likelihood of not responding to treatment exclude offenders from certain 
programs?  While such a practice may seem novel, some states already are 
engaging in this type of screening and decision making.  While such a 
practice may seem novel, some states already are engaging in this type of 
screening and decision making by using various tests to determine 
eligibility for certain treatment programs.  And there is research to suggest 
that other types of tests—specifically neuropsychological examinations—
can predict poor treatment responsiveness.173  If brain (and genetic) 
variables add predictive utility above and beyond that which can be 
achieved with existing measures, the application of these measures in 
offender populations may give rise to equal protection and discrimination 
arguments.  However, those same arguments can be raised based on 
exclusion using other measures such as neuropsychological or PCL-R data.  
If we are comfortable with predicting a particular outcome at all, we will 
likely be comfortable with predicting that outcome even better, regardless 
of the variable type used to make the prediction. 
A critical aspect to an analysis of the issues raised above needs to tease 
apart the legal and ethical issues that arise from prediction generally to the 
issues unique to neuroscience specifically.  The unique nature of 
neuroscientific data being used as legal evidence in a number of different 
prediction contexts is a topic scholars have begun to discuss, and a detailed 
analysis of these and related ethical issues are topics worthy of 
investigation.174 
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CONCLUSION 
Traditional risk-assessment methods are approximations for underlying 
neurobiological processes.  If we are interested in behaviors like cognition, 
intelligence, maturity, and decision-making ability, then we are interested in 
brain structure and function. 
Improved technology has made high-quality neuroimaging data 
collection more accessible and more easily applied to scientific research, so 
it is appropriate to start thinking about how neuroscience variables can be 
used to improve existing behavioral prediction methods.  This Article 
should not be interpreted as suggesting that neuroimaging data needs to be 
collected from every individual arrested nor that neuroimaging data will be 
able to improve prediction of every decision in the system.  However, it is 
reasonable to recognize the utility in continuing to collect neuroimaging 
data in forensic populations to fully explore how measures of brain 
structure and function relate to complex behaviors and to improve tools we 
use to both measure behavior and evaluate risk.  This is all done in pursuit 
of the goal of making better decisions—not perfect decisions, simply the 
most informed decisions possible—using attainable information. 
Indeed, no risk assessment instrument is perfect, but the legal system 
does not require perfection.  What is required, thanks to an evolution in case 
law and the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is that evidence-
based assessments that are used should be valid, reliable, and (ideally) 
appropriately applied to the question at hand.175  The two forensic 
neuroprediction studies discussed in this Article provide a strong 
demonstration of how neuroscience measures can change the way we think 
about variables that we already recognize for their influence on behavior.  
We understand that factors such as age and maturity or level of impulsivity 
have a great deal to do with our decision making and behavior, and most of 
us are comfortable with the utility of such measures influencing 
expectations about certain outcomes.  What these examples illustrate is that 
brain measures can occasionally offer a more precise and sensitive method 
of quantifying the variability in constructs that we know exist.  
Furthermore, because neuroscience measures variables that we know 
directly influence behavior, these are intuitively and objectively more 
closely related to the outcomes we often wish to predict. 
National recidivism rates reflect a criminal justice system that is 
ineffective at remediating criminogenic factors that contribute to the 
“revolving door” problem of incarceration.  There are, of course, many 
factors that contribute to the poor outcomes.  The lack of effective, 
evidence-based treatments, coupled with personality differences that affect 
why and how individuals engage in a criminal behavior (and that therefore 
impact the effectiveness of interventions), perpetuates the lack of 
rehabilitation and therefore leads to an extremely high likelihood of 
returning to prison.  If we are motivated to effect change, we need to work 
to reduce recidivism by implementing interventions that promote desistance 
 
 175. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702. 
2016] PREDICTING ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 531 
from crime.176  An understanding of brain structure and function in 
individuals that have committed violent crimes and that are at high risk for 
committing violence in the future can help identify offenders at the highest 
and lowest risk for offending.  Identifying those possible offenders based on 
their level of risk allows for more efficient allocation of resources.  Even 
among the highest risk individuals, identifying the neural mechanisms at 
work can help isolate targets for specific interventions and, thus, afford an 
opportunity to remediate the risks through treatment. 
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